He starts with the Anselmian concept of a greatest possible being, a concept which implies that God has all of the omni-attributes necessarily. He observes that it is perfectly consistent for an individual essence to have multiple kinds-essences (like Jon is both a teacher and a lawyer) so there is no prima facie problem with Christ having two natures – rather, the properties that those distinct kind-essences instantiate are what create the paradox of the incarnation. To explain, Morris makes a subtle but important distinction between being merely human and fully human. A mere human nature has all the properties essential to being human, but this designation does not exhaust all the possible properties a human might have. This opens the door to a Being who is quite different in nature taking on a human nature, but also being more than that nature. But what happens when the attributes of these two natures come into conflict?
Morris considers the Kenotic view of the incarnation according to which the divine Son of God “empties” himself of certain divine qualities such omniscience and omnipotence in order to taken on a human nature. The Kenotic view differs from the classical view which holds that the God the Son added a human nature to his person without relinquishing the power and knowledge essential to his divine nature. Note: even the classical view acknowledges that certain divine prerogatives were given up in Christ’s self-emptying (see Philippians 2); it’s just that omnipotence and omniscience are essential divine properties and therefore cannot be given up without ceasing to be divine.
Now, when discussing the merits and drawbacks of the Kenotic view, Morris writes, “On this modally less extreme view of divinity, a divine being is not necessarily invulnerable to ignorance or weakness. He can render himself vulnerable to these deficiencies, he can take them on, while yet remaining truly divine” (p.167). But Morris finds the kenotic view unsatisfactory because of its less than maximally exalted view of divinity and for the way it supposedly tailors the concept of God in an ad hoc fashion just to make the incarnation coherent.
In my estimation, Morris fails to consider three possibilities:
(1) a self-limiting God is arguably more exalted and perfect than otherwise (this is C. Stephen Evans’ position);
(2) the charge of being ad hoc is weak because there may be other a priori philosophical grounds for preferring a kenotic view. For example, some philosophers such as Richard Swinburne (who, b/t/w is no friend of kenosis) maintains that omnipotence involves the ability to give up power, not just refrain from using it, which is what Kenotic theorists have been saying. Also, it is possible that the very nature of love itself (perhaps God’s most salient attribute) implies a deep form of self-limitation within the Trinity itself – deeper than simply being affected by another;
Finally, (3) Morris seems not to give the data of scriptural revelation adequate weight when assessing the a priori philosophical intuitions he appeals to for constructing his maximal concept of God. But if scripture indicates that God is able to limit himself by giving up some power (as suggested by Jesus’ radical dependence on the Father, and his profound identification with the plight of humanity), then I would say “all the worse for Anselmian theism!”
What do you, the reader, think? Is the divine Son of God less exalted if he is capable of giving up some of his own power to identify with us and become flesh? Is the very notion of God relinquishing power incoherent?
 Morris is assuming that the most “exalted” concept of divinity is a modally maximized one. But I beg to differ. C. Stephen Evans has argued that a God who can make himself vulnerable and weak, who can limit his own power and knowledge, is in fact greater and more excellent than a God who cannot. If this intuition is defensible, as I think it is, then I would claim, contra Morris, that the most exalted concept of divinity makes the maintenance of the omni-attributes contingent on the divine will. This would imply that God necessarily (in all possible worlds) possesses the property of “being omnipotent unless freely and temporarily choosing to be otherwise” (Morris, 1991 p.167).